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TRACKING THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW 
INTERNATIONAL NORM: THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE 
CRISIS IN DARFUR 
Max W. Matthews* 
Abstract: Since 2005, both the U.N. General Assembly and the Security 
Council have expressed for the first time a clear acceptance of the exis-
tence of a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Though scholars 
have since debated the legal status of this responsibility, commonly re-
ferred to as R2P, it is most accurately described as a declaratory principle 
rather than a binding rule of international law. Still, recent resolutions by 
the Security Council, particularly those in reaction to the ongoing atroci-
ties in Darfur, Sudan, explicitly invoke R2P while calling for protective ac-
tions in accordance with the principle. If the Security Council continues 
to implement R2P, the principle may crystallize into a binding norm of 
international law in the foreseeable future. 
Introduction 
 In the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit of the 
United Nations General Assembly, the international community ex-
pressed for the first time a clear acceptance of the existence of a re-
sponsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity.1 The Outcome Document in-
cludes in this responsibility taking prompt and decisive collective ac-
tion, diplomatically if possible, but militarily if peaceful means prove 
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their 
populations from such crimes.2 The inclusion of the principle, coined 
                                                                                                                      
* Max W. Matthews is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. The author would like to thank Michelle Callner, Chris Franciose, Ken Hur-
witz, Dr. Daryl Matthews, and Esther Solomon for their encouragement and assistance 
throughout the drafting process. 
1 See 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–139, U.N. 
GAOR, 60th sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Outcome Docu-
ment]. 
2 See id. 
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among international legal scholars as the “responsibility to protect,” or 
“R2P,” was due in large part to a seminal report entitled The Responsi-
bility to Protect (R2P Report), published by the Canadian-sponsored 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) in 2001,3 and two United Nations (U.N.) reports on reform 
produced before the 2005 World Summit.4 In April 2006, the principle 
was reaffirmed in a resolution by the U.N. Security Council.5 
 Proponents of R2P acknowledge that major challenges remain in 
implementing and actualizing the responsibility to protect.6 In particu-
lar, the current humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan has been cited as a 
test case for the U.N.’s commitment to the concept, and demonstrates 
the many hurdles still standing in the way of effective intervention to 
protect civilians caught up in armed conflict.7 
 Part I of this Note begins with a short history of the international 
legal discourse and doctrinal basis that resulted in the formulation of 
R2P. This section also describes the R2P framework, positing R2P 
within the ongoing debate regarding moral and legal justifications for 
humanitarian intervention, and its ultimate adoption by the U.N. This 
part concludes with a summary of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur 
and the international community’s reactions to that crisis. Part II dis-
cusses responses to the R2P Report and its subsequent adoption by the 
U.N., and then addresses competing arguments weighing the current 
legal status of R2P. Finally, Part III contains a prediction of future codi-
fication and implementation of the principle, using the Security Coun-
                                                                                                                      
3 See Int’l Comm’n on Intervention & State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Re-
port of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), available at 
www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf [hereinafter ICISS Report]. The Commission 
members were Gareth Evans (Aust.), Mohamed Sahnoun (Alg.), Gisèle Côté-Harper 
(Can.), Lee Hamilton (U.S.), Michael Ignatieff (Can.), Vladimir Lukin (Russ.), Klaus 
Naumann (F.R.G.), Cyril Ramaphosa (S. Afr.), Fidel V. Ramos (Phili.), Cornelio Summa-
ruga (Switz.), Eduardo Stein Barillus (Guat.), and Ramesh Thakur (India). Id. at 77–79. 
4 See The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights for All, ¶ 135, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) 
[hereinafter In Larger Freedom]; The Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶¶ 201–203, delivered 
to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter A More Secure 
World]. 
5 S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
6 See, e.g., S. Neil MacFarlane et al., The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in 
Humanitarian Intervention?, 25 Third World Q. 977, 980–81 (2004). 
7 See Irene Khan, Kenneth Roth & Gareth Evans, Joint Letter to the U.N. Security 
Council, May 25, 2006, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/05/25/su-
dan13462.htm. 
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cil’s reactions to the genocide in Darfur as a basis for predicting the 
potential crystallization8 of an international norm. 
I. Background 
A. Before the International Commission on Intervention and  
State Sovereignty and the Birth of R2P 
 The notion of R2P arose from a perceived need to establish inter-
national guidance for dealing with imminent or ongoing incidents of 
ethnic cleansing and genocide.9 “‘Humanitarian intervention’ has been 
controversial both when it happens, and when it has failed to happen.”10 
The international community’s failure to prevent or halt either the 100-
day genocidal slaughter of 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis in 1994 or the mass-
murder of over 8,000 Bosnians by an ethnic Serbian militia in 1995 laid 
bare the horror of inaction.11 Whereas in 1999, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s war against Serbian forces to halt the ethnic 
cleansing of Kosovar Albanians raised serious questions about the le-
gitimacy of humanitarian intervention.12 These three cases occurred at 
a time of heightened expectations for effective collective action follow-
ing the end of the Cold War.13 
 The beginning of the R2P Report identifies the entrenched front-
lines of the contemporary policy debate surrounding these interven-
tions: 
For some, the international community is not intervening 
enough; for others it is intervening much too often. For some, 
the only real issue is in ensuring that coercive interventions 
are effective; for others, questions about legality, process and 
the possible misuse of precedent loom much larger. For some, 
the new interventions herald a new world in which human 
                                                                                                                      
8 See Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38 (Feb. 20); 
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 4–11 (4th ed. 1990). ”Crystalli-
zation” refers to the process by which a nonbinding principle transforms into a binding 
rule of international law, for instance, through the evolution of state practice or codifica-
tion within an international treaty. See Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 38; Brownlie, supra. 
9 ICISS Report, supra note 3, at vii. 
10 Id. at vii, 1. 
11 See id. at 1; Bosnian Muslim Guilty but Freed, BBC News, June 30, 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5132684.stm; Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, 
BBC News, Apr. 1, 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1288230.stm. 
12 ICISS Report, supra note 3, at 1. 
13 Id. 
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rights trumps state sovereignty; for others, it ushers in a world 
in which big powers ride roughshod over the smaller ones, 
manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and human 
rights.14 
This seemingly irreconcilable controversy prompted U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan to challenge the international community to “find 
common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting 
in defence of our common humanity.”15 In response, the Canadian 
government sponsored the independent ICISS with the purpose of ex-
ploring the whole range of legal, moral, operational and political ques-
tions rolled up in this debate, in order to consult with the widest possi-
ble range of opinion around the world, and to generate a report that 
would help the Secretary-General and other concerned parties find 
some new common ground.16 
B. The R2P Framework 
 After about a year of deliberation, the ICISS published the R2P 
Report, which was widely praised for moving the debate beyond the 
impasse while preserving the integrity of the principle of state sover-
eignty.17 The Report reconfigured the terms of the debate, focusing 
affirmatively on the responsibilities of sovereignty, including each state’s 
“primary responsibility for the protection of its people,”18 rather than 
focusing on the right of one or more states to intervene in the affairs of 
another.19 Where the individual state is unable or unwilling to carry out 
this primary responsibility to protect, the Report affirms the responsi-
bility of the international community to ensure protection of popula-
tions at risk.20 
 The R2P Report sets forth three responsibilities: to prevent, react, 
and rebuild.21 The Report highlights the priority of prevention of crimes 
                                                                                                                      
14 Id. at 1–2. 
15 Id. at 2 (citing Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Address to the 54th Session of 
the U.N. General Assembly). 
16 Id. at vii. 
17 See, e.g., Jennifer Welsh et al., The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of the In-
ternational Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 57 Int’l J. 489, 492–94 (2002). 
18 ICISS Report, supra note 3, at xi, 16. 
19 See generally T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Ro-
bust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2002) (discussing the right to intervene 
for humanitarian purposes). 
20 ICISS Report, supra note 3, at xi. 
21 Id. 
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against humanity, and the need for an “early warning system.”22 Once 
prevention fails, and crimes against humanity are taking place, states 
have a responsibility to react.23 After the crimes have been brought to a 
stop, the international community has a responsibility to rebuild by as-
sisting in reconstruction and reconciliation, helping to build a durable 
peace, and promoting good governance and sustainable develop-
ment.24 
 Additionally, the R2P Report affirms the need for a range of esca-
lating non-coercive and coercive measures to prevent or halt crimes 
against humanity.25 The ultimate coercive measure—military interven-
tion—is reserved as a remedy of last resort.26 The Report establishes 
specific criteria for military intervention to be justified and specific 
standards governing how such actions should be conducted.27 These 
criteria include “just cause,” “right authority,” “right intention,” “last 
resort,” “proportional means,” and “reasonable prospects.”28 The only 
just cause for military intervention is to halt or revert “large scale loss of 
life” or “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing.’”29 The primary purpose, or right 
intention, of the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering, 
regardless of intervening states’ other motives.30 The scale, duration, 
and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the mini-
mum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question, and 
the means employed must be proportional to the ends sought.31 There 
must be reasonable prospects for success in halting or averting the suffer-
ing, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than those 
of inaction.32 Finally, the intervention may only proceed with the right 
authority; Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought 
prior to any military action.33 If the Council rejects a proposal or fails to 
deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative options include considera-
tion of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Ses-
sion under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure, and action by regional 
                                                                                                                      
22 Id. at 19–27. 
23 Id. at 29–37. 
24 Id. at 39–45. 
25 ICISS Report, supra note 3, at 29–31. 
26 Id. at 36–37. 
27 Id. at 31–37. 
28 Id. at xii–xiii, 32–37. 
29 Id. at xii, 32. 
30 ICISS Report, supra note 3, at xii, 35. 
31 Id. at xii, 37. 
32 Id. at 37. 
33 Id. at xii, 50. 
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or sub-regional organizations, subject to their seeking subsequent au-
thorization from the Security Council.34 
 Without opining on proposals for future Security Council reform, 
the Report sought to eliminate Security Council gridlock by proposing 
a “code of conduct” for the use of the veto with respect to actions that 
are needed to stop or avert a humanitarian crisis.35 In matters where its 
“vital national interests were not claimed to be involved,” a permanent 
member would not use its veto to obstruct the passage of what would 
otherwise be a majority resolution—a “constructive abstention.”36 
C. United Nations Adoption of R2P 
 The formation of the ICISS and drafting of the R2P Report coin-
cided with increased interest among the international community, the 
Security Council, and the Secretary-General about the development 
of international doctrine addressing the protection of civilians.37 Be-
tween 2001 and 2005, the Secretary-General submitted two reports at 
the request of the Security Council regarding the protection of civil-
ians.38 In particular, the ideas and principles in the R2P Report were 
endorsed by the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, which reported to Kofi Annan in December 
2004.39 The only major divergence between the R2P Report and the 
High-level Panel Report is that the latter omitted any discussion of a 
“constructive abstention” by the Permanent Five.40 Mr. Annan warmly 
received the High-level Panel Report by incorporating all its proposals 
relating to the responsibility to protect and the use of force into his 
own report, In Larger Freedom.41 Mr. Annan’s report was distributed 
in the spring of 2005 for discussion within the General Assembly in 
preparation for the Summit the following September.42 
                                                                                                                      
34 Id. at xiii, 53–54. 
35 ICISS Report, supra note 3, at xiii, 51. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 
the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2001/331 (Mar. 30, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Protection of Civilians Report]. 
38 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/740 (Nov. 28, 2005); 2001 
Protection of Civilians Report, supra note 37. 
39 See generally A More Secure World, supra note 4. 
40 See Nicholas J. Wheeler, A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect af-
ter the 2005 World Summit, 2 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Rel. 95, 96 (2005). 
41 In Larger Freedom, supra note 4, ¶ 135; see also Wheeler, supra note 40, at 99 (describ-
ing endorsement of R2P within successive U.N. reports). 
42 In Larger Freedom, supra note 4, ¶ 3; Wheeler, supra note 40, at 99. 
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 After much debate at the 2005 World Summit, it was agreed that 
the Outcome Document would contain two paragraphs under the 
heading “Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”43 The first para-
graph affirmed that each state has the responsibility to protect its popu-
lations from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, while 
highlighting that such a responsibility entails the prevention of such 
crimes by appropriate means.44 Additionally, this paragraph acknowl-
edged that the international community should encourage and help 
states to exercise this responsibility and should support the U.N. in es-
tablishing an early warning capability.45 
 The second paragraph affirmed that the international community, 
through the U.N., “[H]as the responsibility to use appropriate diplo-
matic, humanitarian and other peaceful means . . . to help protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.”46 If peaceful means are inadequate and national au-
thorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from such 
crimes, the international community declared that it is prepared to 
take collective military action through the Security Council in a timely 
and decisive manner.47 Finally, the General Assembly stressed the need 
for it to “continue consideration of the responsibility to protect . . . and 
its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the [U.N.] Charter 
and international law.”48 
 Official endorsement of R2P culminated when the Security Coun-
cil passed Resolution 1674 on April 28, 2006.49 This resolution “Reaf-
firms the provisions . . . of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”50 
                                                                                                                      
43 Outcome Document, supra note 1, ¶¶ 138–139; U.N. Non-Governmental Liason 
Serv., 2005 World Summit: An Era of Peril and Promise, NGLS Roundup, Oct. 2005, at 1. 
44 Outcome Document, supra note 1, ¶ 138. 
45 Id. An early warning mechanism was subsequently created in 2004 when the Secre-
tary-General established the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. 
See Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, http://www.un.org/Depts/ 
dpa/prev_genocide/index.htm (last visited Jan 25, 2008). 
46 Outcome Document, supra note 1, ¶ 139. 
47 See id. 
48 Id. 
49 See S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 5, ¶ 4. 
50 Id. 
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D. The Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur and the International  
Community’s Reactions 
 The current humanitarian crisis in Darfur has been cited by sev-
eral commentators as a test case for the international community’s 
commitment to R2P.51 The U.N. considers the Darfur conflict to be 
one of the world’s worst ongoing humanitarian crises.52 Since 2003, 
the Sudanese government and its proxy militia have waged a brutal 
campaign against the people of Darfur, a region in Western Sudan 
about the size of Texas.53 Several hundred thousand people have been 
killed or badly injured.54 The conflict has displaced more than two 
million people, who now live in displaced-persons camps in Sudan or 
in refugee camps in Chad, and more than 3.5 million people are reli-
ant on international aid for survival.55 
 The Darfur conflict stems from long-term disputes over resources 
between the region’s farmers and herders.56 “This conflict grew out of 
opposition to the Sudanese government by two rebel groups, the Su-
dan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement 
( JEM), which primarily draw their support from the Fur, Masalit and 
Zaghawa ethnic groups.”57 The SLA and JEM aim to compel the gov-
ernment of Sudan to address underdevelopment and the political 
marginalization of non-Arabs in Darfur.58 In response, the Sudanese 
armed forces and a government-backed militia known as the Jan-
jaweed—largely composed of fighters of Arab background—have at-
tacked civilian populations suspected of supporting the rebels.59 The 
Janjaweed and Sudanese military, paramilitary, and police have em-
ployed a wide range of tactics against civilians, including aerial bomb-
ings, heavy shelling, ground attacks, bulldozing and burning of vil-
lages, arrests and extrajudicial execution, kidnapping, torture, and 
rape.60 The violence against Darfur’s civilian population has been 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Khan et al., supra note 7. 
52 U.N. Mission in Sudan, Darfur and the Peacebuilding, http://www.unmis.org/ eng-
lish/darfur.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Darfur and the Peacebuilding]. 
53 Human Rights First, About the Crisis, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/interna-
tional_justice/darfur/about/background.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2008). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Human Rights First—About the Crisis, supra note 53. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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widely recognized as genocide.61 Unfortunately, despite the signing of 
a series of ceasefire and peace agreements, there has been increased 
violence including credible allegations of torture and attacks on civil-
ians by signatories and non-signatories alike.62 This violence makes it 
dangerous, if not impossible, for most of the millions of displaced 
persons to return home.63 
 In 2004, the African Union established the African Union Mis-
sion in Sudan (AMIS) with the primary mission of performing peace-
keeping operations related to the Darfur conflict.64 A series of U.N. 
Security Council resolutions in 2004 and 2005 established the United 
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and since then the crisis has re-
mained on the Council’s agenda.65 UNMIS oversees all U.N. military, 
humanitarian, and diplomatic activity in Sudan and works with AMIS 
in its efforts to establish peace and stability in Darfur, though none of 
its military personnel operate in Darfur.66 Due to limited human and 
financial resources, AMIS has been unable to either secure effective 
implementation of the most recent peace agreement or even stem the 
escalating violence.67 In 2006, Security Council resolutions called for 
an extension of UNMIS to include a robust military force to take over 
peacekeeping operations from AMIS.68 A transition, however, was 
made contingent on the Sudanese government’s consent, which was 
adamantly withheld until a year of threats and negotiations led to its 
acceptance of an “AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur” (UNAMID) 
consisting predominantly of African troops, which should be operat-
ing by the end of 2007.69 
                                                                                                                      
61 See, e.g., Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, § 3, Pub. L. No. 109–344, 120 
Stat. 1869 (recognition, by the U.S. Congress, that the violence in Dafur is genocide). 
62 Human Rights First—About the Crisis, supra note 53. 
63 Id. 
64 See African Union Mission in Sudan, Mandate, http://www.amis-
sudan.org/amismandate.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2008). 
65 See U.N. Mission in Sudan, Mission Background, http://www.unmis.org/english/ 
background.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008); Darfur and the Peacebuilding, supra note 52. 
66 See Darfur and the Peacebuilding, supra note 52; U.N. Mission in Sudan, Military 
Component, http://www.unmis.org/english/military.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008); U.N. 
Mission in Sudan, UNMIS Questions & Answers, http://www.unmis.org/english/Q-A.htm 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2008). 
67 See Khan et al., supra note 7. 
68 S.C. Res. 1679, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1679 (May 16, 2006). 
69 See S.C. Res. 1769, pmbl., ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 ( July 31, 2007); S.C. Res. 
1706, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); Simon Apiku, Sudan Bowed to Pressure on 
Darfur Force—Opposition, Reuters, June 19, 2007, available at http://www. 
reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1973884020070619. 
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II. Discussion 
A. Responses to the R2P Report and Its Subsequent Adoption by the U.N. 
 Among scholars, responses to the R2P Report have varied widely.70 
Many scholars view R2P as the most comprehensive framework for ap-
proaching humanitarian intervention ever put forth.71 Some commen-
tators are skeptical of the R2P Report and consider it dangerously dis-
respectful of current international law.72 Others claim that it merely 
legitimizes the status quo by relying on the Security Council as the pri-
mary authorizing body.73 
 Much of the criticism of the R2P Report mirrors that which under-
lies the preexisting debate about humanitarian intervention.74 Some 
argue that a simple change in language from “humanitarian interven-
tion” to the “responsibility to protect” does not circumvent the necessity 
of resolving the debates that have always existed regarding interven-
tion.75 
 There are also significant fears that R2P principles are simply a 
“cover for legitimating the neo-colonialist tendencies of major pow-
ers.”76 Some scholars maintain that “such proposals have no impact 
on the realpolitik driving actual decision making.77 In particular, a fun-
damental problem is that no matter what criteria are established for a 
justifiable intervention, the decisive factors will always be “authority, 
political will, and operational capacity . . . .”78 Nonetheless, within just 
five years after its publication, the R2P Report gained enough signifi-
cance that its framing of the issues and its language infiltrated discus-
sions of humanitarian crises to such an extent that both the General 
                                                                                                                      
70 Rebecca J. Hamilton, The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine—But What 
of Implementation?, 19 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 289, 291 (2006). 
71 Id. at 292 (citing David M. Malone, Recent Books on International Law, 97 Am. J. Int’l 
999, 1001 (2003) and Joelle Tanguy, Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention, Ethics & Int’l 
Aff., Spring 2003, at 141–42). 
72 See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Taking Opinio Juris Seriously, A Classical Approach to 
International Law on the Use of Force, in Customary International Law on the Use of 
Force 9, 28–29 (Enzo Cannizzaro & Paolo Palchetti eds., 2005). 
73 See, e.g., Jeremy I. Levitt, The Responsibility to Protect: A Beaver Without a Dam?, 25 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 153, 176 (2003) (reviewing the ICISS Report). 
74 See Welsh et al., supra note 17, at 500. 
75 See id. 
76 Hamilton, supra note 70, at 292 (citing Mohammed Ayoob, Third World Perspectives on 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration, 10 Global Governance 99, 115 
(2004)). 
77 Id. at 291. 
78 See MacFarlane et al., supra note 6, at 980. 
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Assembly and Security Council have affirmed the international re-
sponsibility to protect.79 
 U.N. adoption was met with criticism because of aspects of the R2P 
framework it failed to include.80 For example, the two paragraphs of 
the Outcome Document make no mention of a Security Council “con-
structive abstention.”81 Additionally, it does not refer explicitly to a re-
sponsibility to use military force; it merely expresses that the interna-
tional community is prepared to use military force when appropriate.82 
B. The Legal Status of R2P 
 At the time of the publication of the R2P Report, experts on the 
Commission were clear: the international obligations of R2P are not 
part of what is considered “binding” international law.83 Rather, R2P 
was described specifically as “the emerging guiding principle . . . 
grounded in a miscellany of legal foundations (human rights treaty 
provisions, the Genocide Convention, Geneva Conventions, Interna-
tional Criminal Court statute and the like), growing state practice— 
and the Security Council’s own practice.”84 The Commission noted, 
however, that if the Security Council continues to give further credence 
to R2P and its doctrinal basis, that “it may eventually be that a new rule 
of customary international law to this effect comes to be recognized 
. . . .”85 
 Since publication of the R2P Report, the General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions described above have undoubtedly en-
hanced the force of R2P, moving the principle further along the con-
tinuum toward binding law.86 Security Council resolutions sometimes 
have the force of binding international law, so one could argue that the 
Council’s formal adoption has crystallized a new norm of binding in-
                                                                                                                      
79 See Outcome Document, supra note 1, ¶¶ 138–139; S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 5, ¶ 4; 
Hamilton, supra note 70, at 293. 
80 See Wheeler, supra note 40, at 96, 102. 
81 See Outcome Document, supra note 1, ¶¶ 138–139; see also ICISS Report, supra note 3, 
at 51 (proposing a “constructive abstention”); Wheeler, supra note 40, at 96 (criticizing the 
Outcome Document for not discussing what should occur if the Security Council was un-
able or unwilling to act). 
82 See Outcome Document, supra note 1, ¶ 139. 
83 See ICISS Report, supra note 3, at 15, 50. 
84 Id. at 50. 
85 Id. 
86 See Outcome Document, supra note 1, ¶¶ 138–139; S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 5, ¶ 4; 
ICISS Report, supra note 3, at 50. 
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ternational law.87 Such a view, however, is uncorroborated when con-
sidered in light of the clear language of the authors of the R2P Report: 
“we have already acknowledged it would be quite premature to make 
any claim about the existence now of such a rule.”88 Implicitly, further 
codification or implementation of R2P would be necessary before the 
principle crystallizes into “binding” international law.89 
III. Analysis 
 Two key questions must be addressed to discern whether interna-
tional reactions to the Darfur crisis foretell crystallization of R2P.90 
First, to what extent have international reactions to the crisis demon-
strated implementation of R2P?91 Second, and more specifically, was 
the Security Council’s attempt to secure the Sudanese government’s 
consent before deploying international troops consistent with the R2P 
framework?92 
A. Security Council Implementation of R2P 
 As described above, the international community has been ac-
tively involved in Darfur.93 In this context, there are several indica-
tions that the Security Council is implementing the R2P framework.94 
For example, the same day the Security Council reaffirmed R2P, it 
passed Resolution 1672, placing sanctions on individual Sudanese of-
ficials responsible for crimes against humanity in Darfur.95 Sanctions 
on individuals are one of the reactive measures included within R2P 
short of military force.96 
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 Prior to the adoption of R2P, the U.N. had been in Darfur for 
several years without the Security Council calling for an international 
military force to intervene, but almost immediately after affirming 
R2P in Resolution 1674, it called for such a force.97 On May 16, 2006, 
less than a month after Resolution 1674, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1679 calling for the transition of military operations in 
Darfur from AMIS to UNMIS and for an assessment team to visit the 
region to prepare for this transition.98 
 The preamble of Resolution 1679 explicitly recalls Resolution 
1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.99 Thus, this is 
the first example of the Security Council invoking its responsibility to 
protect civilians from crimes against humanity while simultaneously 
acting in accordance with that responsibility.100 Such consistency was 
repeated on August 31, 2006, when the Security Council passed Reso-
lution 1706, further specifying the nature of the U.N. force which will 
replace AMIS.101 Resolution 1706 recalls Resolution 1674 on the pro-
tection of civilians in armed conflict with the exact same language 
employed in Resolution 1679, therefore constituting a second exam-
ple of the Security Council directly invoking R2P while calling for ac-
tions within the principle’s framework.102 
 While gradually increasing pressure on Sudan to accept a U.N. 
deployment, the Security Council reaffirmed R2P in a resolution on 
April 30, 2007 that extended the mandate of UNMIS.103 As soon as 
Sudan succumbed to international will and consented to a hybrid 
force, the Security Council invoked R2P on July 31, 2007 in the reso-
lution authorizing that force.104 Resolution 1769 signifies an even 
greater endorsement of R2P than the previous three resolutions by 
further emphasizing the need to focus on finalizing “preparations for 
reconstruction and development.”105 This illustrates the Security 
Council’s endorsement of its responsibility to protect civilians, while 
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calling for measures that coincide with multiple principles in the R2P 
framework: to react and, then, rebuild.106 
 Despite much preparation, a robust international force has not 
yet been sent to Darfur, while violence continues to escalate.107 Critics 
emphasize that the crisis is a textbook case of a government being 
unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility and that the interna-
tional community’s failure to end the genocide signifies this R2P test 
case’s failure.108 Such an assertion, however, overlooks the complex 
framework of R2P.109 Though the Security Council has yet to end the 
crisis in Darfur, its resolutions discussed above demonstrate support 
of the R2P framework.110 While it is perhaps too early to call these 
resolutions a trend, the references to R2P suggest that the Security 
Council may be taking its responsibility to protect seriously and will 
continue to act accordingly.111 Proponents of R2P, even those who re-
gret that the Security Council has not taken a more aggressive stance, 
should be reassured that R2P is showing—in the case of Darfur—such 
immediate signs of implementation.112 
B. The Issue of Consent 
 Advocates of U.N. intervention in Darfur have criticized the Se-
curity Council for leaving deployment dependent on the consent of 
the government of Sudan.113 Requiring consent before deployment 
may represent a half-hearted adoption of R2P, making the test case of 
Darfur indicative of a less than favorable future for the principle’s le-
gal status.114 
 Contrarily, there is nothing inherently adverse to the R2P frame-
work about seeking government consent prior to sending an inter-
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ventionist force.115 In fact, much of the R2P framework suggests that 
the international community should, as much as possible, work with 
the governments of states in which crimes against humanity are taking 
place (or are about to occur), in an effort to stop the violence.116 This 
aspect of R2P shows that the State has the primary responsibility to 
protect and is in the best position to fulfill that responsibility.117 Im-
plicitly, the U.N. will be most successful in fulfilling its responsibility to 
protect when it has secured cooperation of the state’s government.118 
 Viewing the current political, military, and diplomatic situation 
involving Darfur in light of the R2P framework, government consent 
before deployment is arguably more in line with R2P than immediate 
intervention.119 The conflict in Darfur is complicated, involving fight-
ing amongst numerous armed groups, several of whom are perpetrat-
ing crimes against humanity.120 The situation is such that a U.N.-
backed force would probably be necessary to stop the violence, even if 
the government honored the ceasefire.121 Securing the Sudanese gov-
ernment’s consent before deploying an international force in Darfur 
avoids the potentially catastrophic prospect of blue helmets engaged 
in combat with the Sudanese Armed Forces.122 Accordingly, securing 
the consent of the government will allow the peacekeeping force to 
carry out its mandate more effectively.123 Finally, seeking consent be-
fore deployment is consistent with the “reasonable prospects” and 
“proportional means” criteria for R2P interventions, since an inter-
vention in Darfur is more likely to be successful and of a lower inten-
sity if the Sudanese Army is not obstructing the U.N. force.124 
 Providing a modest glimmer of hope for the people of Darfur 
(and certainly some relief to diplomats and humanitarians), the gov-
ernment of Sudan recently consented to the hybrid deployment au-
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thorized by the Security Council.125 This, however, raises the crucial 
question of whether the Security Council would be willing to author-
ize the use of force if the government of Sudan retracts and withholds 
its consent.126 This currently cannot be predicted with any certainty.127 
Conclusion 
 Future implementation of the Responsibility to Protect will not 
save the hundreds of thousands already killed in Darfur; for them, the 
international community has already failed. It is now crucial that this 
does not lead to the collapse of R2P. 
 The fact that the international community has not yet stopped 
the violence against civilians in Darfur is evidence that realpolitik con-
siderations, lack of political will, and limited military capacity may 
continue to be the most substantial obstacles facing further imple-
mentation and enhancement of R2P. Nonetheless, Security Council 
resolutions show that the U.N. is implementing R2P to a certain ex-
tent. By calling for an international military force to end the violence 
in Darfur in resolutions that explicitly invoke R2P, the Security Coun-
cil is adding further credence to the principle’s legal weight. If a 
trend develops, either in the case of Darfur or generally, then a new 
rule of “binding” international law to this effect may eventually come 
to fruition. Because the spirit and letter of R2P require that the U.N. 
work with state governments toward its implementation, seeking Su-
dan’s consent does not represent a shirking of the U.N.’s responsibil-
ity to protect. With consent given, the biggest test will be whether 
UNAMID becomes operational and fulfills its mandate. 
 The international reaction to Darfur may be too little too late, 
justifying much of the abundant criticism. Nonetheless, this should 
not blind scholars to the slow but discernable emergence of an inter-
national endorsement of a responsibility to protect populations from 
the world’s worst crimes. 
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